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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ENGINEERING COMMIS-
SION, D. H. WHITTENBURG, 
Chairman, H. J. CORLEISSEN 
and LAYTON MAXFIELD, Mem-
bers of the Engineering Commission, 
Pla.intiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FRED TEDESCO and KLEA B. 
TEDESCO, his wife, et al., 
Defendants, 
and 
BIRD & EVANS, INC., 
Counter-Claimants 
and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8270 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Generally, the respondent will be able to agree with 
the statement of facts as set forth in the appellant's 
brief; but in certain specific instances we disagree and 
we also feel that there are some facts of importance 
that are not included, particularly with respect to prior 
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proceedings. We feel that the Court should have a 
chrono1ogical picture of this matter and shall proceed 
accordingly. 
The 1951 State Legislature passed an act, which is 
no"r Section 63-11-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
act granted the State Engineering Commission ''power'' 
to condemn certain therein described real property for 
a state park. The :first special session of the 1951 State 
Legislature, in Section 1 of Chapter 13, Laws of Utah 
1951, First Special Session, amended the act and ''author-
ized and directed'' the Commission to ''forthwith con-
demn'' the described property. 
Accordingly, on July 10, 1951, the Engineering Com-
mission adopted a resolution instructing the Attorney 
General to proceed and suit was :filed and summonses 
were served on the various defendants, one of whom was 
Bird & Evans, Inc. as it w:as the record owner of Parcel 7 
lying within the park boundaries established by the 
legislative enactment. (R. 18) 
We deem it appropriate at this point to specifically 
call the Court's attention to the fact that a jury trial 
was had as to Parcel 7 and that a jury's verdict in the 
sum of $66,000.00 was paid and a :final order of condemna-
tion as to Parcel 7 was entered by the Court on March 
21, 1952. (R. 36 to 39) The land, which is the subject of 
this action, was not contiguous to Parcel 7, was across 
the canyon south from Parcel 7 and is au entirely sepa-
rate tract and is wholly outside the park. (R. 87) 
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~ 
Thereafter, and on April 1, 1952, the trial court 
permitted the appellant, Bird & Evans, Inc., to file a 
eross-complaint and this came on for trial on December 
1, 1952, and a jury V\'"as impaneled. (R. 30-32) However, 
fol]o,ving a ruling by the trial court that the case was 
to be tried upon the theory that Kennedy Drive was 
closed, this Court granted an intermediate appeal; and 
by its decision, now reported in FJta.te v. Bird & Evans, 
I-nc., 265 P. 2d 639, the trial court's ruling in this respect 
,,~as reversed and the cause remanded to be tried in 
accord with that opinion. 
Follfnving remission to the District Court, a formal 
motion to dismiss was made by the respondent and de-
nied by the trial court. (R. 61) Trial was thereupon had 
commencing on July 14, 1954, and, after a jury had been 
selected, the motion to dismiss \vas again renewed and 
urged upon the trial court and a ruling thereon was 
reserved by the trial court. ( R. 67 and 68) 
After the appellant had concluded his evidence, a 
motion to dismiss was again made and again taken 
under advisement ( R. 134) ; and, following the conclu-
sion of ·the trial, a motion for a directed verdict \Vas 
made based upon the same grounds and this motion was 
also taken under advisement. ( R. 177) 
·Following the verdict of the jury, a formal.written 
motion was made for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and the grounds were the same as had been urged 
on the previous motions. ( R. 198 and 199) This motion 
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,,·a~ thereafter argued on July 20, 1954, and on Septem-
ber 28, 1954, an order \vas made granting the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 200) 
The foregoing is a brief history of the litigation and 
is, we believe, an important element to be considered in 
this case. And, in addition to this, \Ve cannot agree with 
appellant as to the alleged agreement between it and the 
\Vagener Improvement Company. In this connection, we 
do not believe that it is appropriate to pick out separate 
sentences from the record and claim proof or lack of 
proof of this supposed agreement. As an example, 
appellants on page 5 of its brief says: "It was further 
agreed that the costs of planning would be divided be-
tween the owners of the two tracts of land in proportion 
to their land holdings, and, in fact, the very considerable 
expense entailed in planning was so borne and was so 
paid.'' It is indicated that this statement is derived 
from the answer of the witness, Brayton, where he said, 
''That is to say Wagener \\rould take care of all of the 
expenses incident to its much larger area and then Bird 
and Evans would take care of the expenses incident to 
its area and did so, so far as I know.'' (R. 72) But there 
is nothing in the record to show how much was expended 
and by whom, and for what. 
We must take issue with, and believe that this is the 
place to do so, the statement by appellant that appears 
on page 19 of its brief as follows: "The state does not 
deny the existence of the agreement between Bird & 
Evans and Wagener Improvement Company for the de-
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velopment of the Oak Hills Subdivision.'' We most 
certainly do deny the existence of any such agreement. 
We took specific exception to Instruction No. 1 to the 
jury where the jury was permitted to consider this 
agreement on the grounds that no agreement had been 
proved. (R. 184-185) And we fully believe that the evi-
dence of the witness, Dean S. Brayton, when read as a 
whole negatives the existence of any agreement. The 
best that could be said for it is that there was an expec-
tatjon and a hope. 
And finally, for the purpose of clarity and to avoid 
repetition and because it is tied to both the facts and the 
law, we feel compelled to set forth the three points that 
were the basis for our motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and which are as follows : 
1. That the State of Utah has not consented to be 
sued herein and this Court is and has been without juris-
diction to entertain this action against the State of Utah. 
2. That it affirmatively and conclusively appears 
from all the proceedings herein that the subject matter 
of this cause is not actionable against the State of Utah 
and not compensable by the State of Utah; and that the 
said cross-complaint of Bird & Evans, Inc. does not state 
any facts upon which a claim against the State of Utah 
could be based and that all the evidence fails to show a 
claim against the State of Utah. 
3. That Bird & Evans, Inc. has not sustained the 
burden of proof required of it and that all the evidence 
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affirmatively and conclusively show·s that any injury or 
damage to it 'vas contingent, remote and speculative. (R. 
198-199) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CLAINI OF APPELLANT WAS NOT PROP-
ERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, 
BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, THE TRIAJ_j COURT 
WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN 
THIS ACTION AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH; 
AND THE n10TION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT WAS PR.OPERLY 
GR.ANTED. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDG-
lvfENT FOR CONDE~1NATION .A.ND DESTRUCTION 
OF ANY ALLEGED OR CLAIMED RECIPROCAL 
COVENANTS; BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, ANY 
ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY TI-IAT APPEL-
LANT CLAIMS TO HAVE SUFFERED IS NOT 
ACTIONABLE AGAINST .A.ND NOT COMPENS-
itBLE BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED OF IT AND THE 
EVIDENCE AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS rrHATANY 
ALLEGED INJURY OR DAMAGE TO IT WAS CON-
TINGENT, REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 
AN AGREEl\iENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT 
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.A.ND WAGENER IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, AND 
THE GRANTING OF THE 1fOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NO~rWITI-ISTANDING THE VERDICT WAS 
1)I{OPER, AS 1~I-IERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND 
IVIATERIAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY 
.itG·REEMENT. 
ARGUJVIENT 
POINT I. 
THE CLAI~I OF 1\_PPELLAl'TT WAS NOrr PROP-
ERLY COGNIZ~~BLE BEFOR]J 'l'HE TRIAI_j COlTRT, 
BUT, ON TI-IE CONTRAI~r:, ~ri-IE TRIA~L C01TRT 
\V . .:'\8 WJTIIOU~r JUiilSDICrriON TO ENTERT.A_IN 
THIS AC/J~ION AGAINST rr,IIE STATE OF UTAH; 
AND TI-IJn 1\IOr~riON FOR JUDGMENT NOrrWITI-I-
STANDil~G rrHE VERDICT "\VAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED. 
In respondent's motion to dismiss before the trial 
court, we urged upon that court the sovereign status of 
the State of Utah and its immunity from suit (R. 67). 
We again urged this point in our motion for nonsuit (R. 
134) and for a 'directed verdict (R.177); and in our formal 
wTitten motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
v:e spelled out in paragraph one of that motion the same 
grounds (R. 198). Appellant's statement at the bottom 
of page 12 of their brief that "it may be that the state 
has abandoned this position as counsel did not argue it 
strenuously", is contrary to the fact and not in accord--
ance with the record. We have steadfastly maintained 
throughout the entire retrial of this proceeding that there 
was a complete lack of jurisdiction as to the·· State of 
Utah by reason of its sovereign immunity from suit 
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without specific legislative consent. And, contrary to 
appellant's statement, the cases of Iljorth c. Whitte1z.-
burg, 241 P. 2d 907, and State r. Fourth District f!ourt, 
94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, are specifically appli('able and 
are the t'vo cases that 've contend conclusively support 
the position "'"e have taken. 
In order to present our position in this respect and 
to correct the erroneous conception as presented by 
appellant, it is necessary to briefly review the prior 
appeal of this case, the reasoning urged upon that appeal 
and the ruling this court now reported in State z,. Bird & 
Evans, supra. Following a ruling by the trial court on 
December 1, 1952, that Kennedy Drive was closed and 
that appellant was entitled to go to trial on that theory, 
this court granted a petition for intermediate appeal. 
The State of Utah, as the appellant in that case, also 
raised the question as to whether the pleading, then 
entitled a cross-complaint, filed by Bird & Evans Inc. 
was not covered by Rule 13(a) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure dealing with compulsory counterclaims. 
This Court ruled that the cross-complaint of the 
then respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., "\Vas not a compul-
sory counterclaim under the language of Rule 13(a) and 
also held that the trial court's ruling as to the. closing 
of l{ennedy Drive was in error; and the case was re-
versed and remanded for proceedings in accordance with 
the opinion of this Court. We desire to emphasize that 
we have not, and do not now, question this Court's ruling 
as to compulsory counterclaims ; and we desire to further 
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emphasize that the present question as to the sovereign 
immunity of the State of Utah was not an issue in the 
former appeal and was not decided by this Court, either 
directly or by implication. 
Whether the pleading filed by Bird & Evans, Inc. is 
termed a cross-complaint, as it was in the first appeal, 
or whether it is a counterclaim, as appellant now refers 
to it, is, we believe, immaterial; and under our view of 
the problem it makes little, if any, difference whether 
it was filed while the appellant was still a defendant in 
the main condemnation action or, as was done here, after 
its interest in that main action had been wholly termi-
nated. No matter how it is viewed, it is an independent 
suit against the State of Utah having as its subject 
matter a completely new issue from that of the original 
condemnation action; and, as such, it is subject to the 
rules laid down in the Hjorth and Fourth District Court 
cases, supra, which we will discuss hereinafter at more 
length. 
Appellant has cited Sections 78-34-7 and 10, Utah 
Code Annoted 1953. At the risk of repetition but in the 
interest of readability, we desire to also quote these 
sections in order to call the Court's attention to the 
specific language therein. Section 78-34-7 reads as fol-
lows: 
''All persons in occupation of, or having or 
claiming an interest in, any of the property de-
scribed in the complaint, or in the damages for 
the taking thereof, though not named, may ap-
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pear, plead and defend, each in respect to llis 
own property or interest, or that claimed by him, 
in the same manner as if named in the complaint.'' 
On page 11 of its brief appellant states that it filed 
its counterclaim under the provisions of this section. 1\ 
careful examination of this section reveals that this 
counterclaim or cross-complaint does not fall within the 
permissive language of this section. 
First, it should be noted that the property for which 
appellant claims damage is entirely outside the boun-
daries of '!,his Is rrhe Place Monument Park and is not 
described, nor is any part of it mentioned, in the com-
plaint filed herein by the State of Utah (R. 11 to 32, 
incl.). The statute above quoted states ''All persons in 
occupation of ... any of the property described in the 
complaint." Clearly, appellant does not fall within that 
language. The second grouping is ''All persons . . . 
having or claiming an interest in any of the property 
described in the complaint.'' Again it is clear and con-
clusive that appellant's claim is not covered. And the 
final group is ''having or claiming an interest ... in the 
damages for the taking thereof,'' i.e., the property de-
scribed in the complaint. vVe urge that none of the 
language in this section gives to this appellant the right 
to ' 'appear, plead and defend. ' ' It specifically refers to 
the property described in the complaint for 'vhich con-
demnation is sought and admittedly the appellant here 
is not in occupation, claims and has no interest in it and 
claims and has no interest in the damages for the taking 
thereof. To attempt to read into this section a right to 
10 
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appear and claim damage for property not sought to be 
condemned and lying \vholly "\Yithout the boundaries of 
the property described in the complaint appears to us 
to be fantastic. If this were to be the law, it would have 
infinite ramifications and there could be no possible con-
elusion of even the simplest of condemnation proceedings. 
In its decision in Hjorth '[;'. Whittenburg, supra, this 
Court said: 
''If all the property to 1Nhich any consequential 
harmful effects had to be considered, and the 
owners joined as condemnees by the Road Com-
mission, it vvould be difficult if not impossible for 
the Commission to kno"\Y whom they could safely 
omit from condemnation proceedings. The only 
safe \vay in "\vhich the Commissioners could oper-
ate \\~ould be to join every property owner abut-
ting on or near the highway projects in order to 
avoid suits "'Which \\'Ould result in personal lia-
bility to them. The irnpracticability of imposing 
such an obliga.tion upon the public body in the 
construction and maintenance of our public high-
ways is obvious." (The italics are ours.) 
As a final comment on this phase, may \Ve note that 
the rule sought for by appellant in this case would affect 
all public bodies clothed with the po"Ter of eminent do-
main and would require the joinder of an infinitely 
greater number of defendants than under the rule sought 
for by the plaintiffs in the Hjorth case. Under the lan-
guage above quoted the utter ''impracticability'' is 
''obvious.'' 
Section 78-34-10 contains five subparagraphs and the 
three quoted by appellant are the only ones applicable 
11 
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here but \Ye contend again that they affirn1atively sho\\· 
that appellant cannot maintain this action against the 
State of Utah. This section reads as follo\VS: 
"The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; and if it con-
sists of different parcels, the value of each parcel 
and of each estate or interest therein shall be 
separately assessed. 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
(3) If the property, though no part thereof 
is taken, 'vill be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, the amount of such 
damages ... " (Italics added.) 
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the 
first paragraph deals with property actually taken and 
the second paragraph deals with what is commonly called 
severance damage and that neither paragraph is applic-
able to appellant's property. It must, therefore, bring 
itself within the provisions of paragraph three and we 
most urgently contend that it does not and cannot qualify 
under the language of that section. We have italicized 
12 
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the words ''construction of the proposed improvement,'' 
and the only conclusion that can be drawn from these 
words is that the damages allowable must flow from this 
construction. In the present case, there is no construc-
tion, no proposed construction and in fact the legislative 
mandate for this condemnation specifically commands no 
construction but rather that the park shall remain in its 
natural state. 
We have heretofore briefly alluded to the cases of 
State v. Fourth District Court, supra, and Hjorth v. 
Whittenburg, supra; and, as we contend that they are 
controlling of the issue here presented, it becomes neces-
sary to thoroughly examine the facts and the decision of 
this court in each case. 
In the Fourth District Court case certain residents 
of West Center Street in Provo sought an injunction 
against the State Road Commission and the contractor 
engaged by the Commission to construct the viaduct over 
the railroad tracks on this street. In this application 
for injunction the plaintiffs alleged that they would be 
deprived of access, that the viaduct would dampen and 
darken their homes, that they would be deprived of their 
easement to light, air and view, and that the grade of 
the street would be raised ; and that, unless the injunc-
tion were granted, they would be deprived of their prop-
erty rights without due process of law. The State Road 
Commission and the contractor applied to this Court for 
a writ of prohibition to prevent the District Court from 
proceeding with the injunction suit. By its decision, this 
13 
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Court made the writ permanent as to the State l~oad 
Commission denied it as to the contractor and indicated 
' that injunction proceedings against the individual mem-
bers of the State Road Commission would be proper if 
the plaintiffs in the injunction suit were to ask leave to 
amend so as to include those individuals personally as 
defendants. It should be noted that only three members 
of this Court joined in the majority decision and that a 
well written minority opinion was handed down by the 
other two members of the Court, who contended that 
the injunction suit against members of the Road Com-
mission individually was not proper and that the remedy 
was before the Board of Examiners. 
But all five members of the Court held that the in-
junction could not be maintained against the State of 
Utah and, on page 504 of the Pacific Reporter, the Court 
said: 
"The State Road Commission is an agency of 
the State. It is clothed with certain powers in the 
nature of corporate powers, but cannot be con-
sidered to be a corporation. It may sue in its 
own name, and section (now 27-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953) provides that it may be sued 
only on written contracts. Being an unincor-
porated agency of the State, a suit against it is 
a suit against the State. The State cannot be sued 
unless it has given its consent or has waived its 
immunity. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 
Pac. 626; Campbell Building Co. v. State Road 
Commission, (Utah), 70 P. 2d 857. Defendants 
do not argue in their briefs that. consent has been 
given by the State or that" there has been any 
waiver of the State's immunity from suit. Their 
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argument is that the injunction suit is not against 
the State. We cannot agree with this argument 
insofar as the Road Commission as such is con-
cerned. It is an agency of the State and a suit 
against it is a suit against the State ... " 
And the final ruling, as reported on page 512 of the 
Pacific Reporter, is as follows: 
'' rrhe alternative writ of prohibition hereto-
fore issued herein is hereby modified, in accord-
ance with the opinion herein expressed, so as to 
eliminate from said writ any prohibition against 
proceedings in the case therein referred to as 
against defendants other than the State Road 
Commission. Insofar as the writ prohibits pro-
ceedings in the district court as against the State 
Road Commission, the same is made perma-
nent ... " 
In the Hjorth v. Whittenburg case, supra, the plain-
tiffs sought an injunction against the individual members 
of the Road Commission to prevent a threatened and 
alleged damage to their property, none of which was 
taken or used for the roadway, by a raising in the grade 
of the road as much as four feet above the level of the 
contiguous ground. At the time of the hearing the 
roadway was almost completely constructed and the 
district court permitted an amendment to the complaint 
to include damages and thereafter assessed damages 
against the individual members of the Road Commission 
upon the authority of the Fourth District Court case. 
Upon the appeal this Court held that the members of the 
Road Commission were not personally liable for damages 
where they acted in good faith to improve the highway. 
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Both the plaintiffs in this case and the Court recognized 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable 
as far as the State of Utah and the State Road Commis-
sion were concerned. 
The only difference between the fact situation in 
these two decided cases and the present one is that the 
appellant here was fortunate enough to have a parcel 
of property that 'vas included within the original con-
demnation action, although this parcel '\vas a consider-
able distance away from the one for which it now seeks 
damage. That one rule of la'v should apply to appellant 
and another rule for those not so fortunately situated is, 
of course, unthinkable; and we respectfully submit that 
this is an attempted proceeding against the State of 
Utah wherein there has been no waiver of sovereign 
immunity and that no jurisdiction has been conferred 
on the trial court and that the granting of the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper 
and should be affirmed. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission of 
Utah, 327 U.S. 573, 90 L.Ed. 862, states the rule applic-
able that statutes waiving sovereign immunity are sub-
ject to a strict and literal interpretation in favor of the 
state and against the waiver of immunity. In that case 
the plaintiff sought to recover taxes claimed to be wrong-
fully exacted by suit in the federal courts under a statute 
providing that the action could be brought in any court 
of competent jurisdiction. The Court held that this 
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language 'vould be construed to apply only to courts of 
the State of Utah and used this language "that clear 
declaration of a state's consent to suit against itself in 
the federal court on fiscal claims is required.'' 
The annotation following the above case at 90 L.Ed. 
869 generally covers the subject and emphasizes the 
general rule that statutes waiving sovereign immunity 
are to be strictly construed. 
The following three points of the brief of respondent 
are written without regard to this question of sovereign 
immunity; but their consideration and a ruling thereon 
would become unnecessary if this Honorable Court sus-
tains the position we have taken here. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT FOR CONDEMNATION AND DESTRUCTION 
OF ANY ALLEGED OR CLAIMED RECIPROCAL 
COVENANTS; BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, ANY 
ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY THAT APPEL-
LANT CLAIMS TO HAVE SUFFERED IS NOT 
ACTIONABLE AGAINST AND NOT COMPENS-
ABLE BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In its argument as to its point two, appellant assumes 
the existence of an agreement between itself and the 
Wagener Improvement Company. As we have declared 
in our statement of facts and as we will explore more 
fully later in this brief, we contend that there wa~ no 
material proof as to the existence of any agreement, but 
rather that the proof showed that appellant was relying 
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upon an expectation and a hope as to the future develop-
ment by the Wagener Improvement Company. 
However, even if this agreement were sufficiently 
shown by the evidence so as to make it proper to submit 
it to a jury, we contend that it still does not provide a 
basis upon which compensable damage could be allowed 
the appellant; and we believe that appellant has mis-
applied the law to the facts of the instant case and that 
it fails to distinguish between restrictive covenants that 
apply to the land and create a negative easement therein 
and on the other hand a purely personal agreement be-
tween two parties that has nothing to do with the land 
involved. 
Appellant secured the admission of Exhibit 8 over 
respondent's objection. (R. 81). This exhibit constituted 
the restrictive covenants that had been recorded with 
respect to Oak Hills Plat A, which was a small area some 
distance across the canyon from the property involved 
in the present action. The evidence also showed a hope 
and an expectation that at some future date and, de-
pending on a number of conditional factors, restrictive 
covenants of a similar nature but with changes to meet 
other conditions, which conditions are not named or 
described, would be drawn up and filed for the property 
on the south side of the canyon and also for the property 
of the appellant. 
At this juncture, we desire to emphasize that there 
is not a scintilla of evidence that the condemnation of the 
property by the State of Utah had any effect whatsoever 
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upon these restrictive covenants or in any way violated 
their terms; but, on the contrary, it can be just as well 
imagined that the condemnation proceeding enhanced 
the value of appellant's property. 
The cases that appellant cites under Point Two of 
his brief are collected and discussed at considerable 
length in the case cited by appellant, namely, Johnstone 
v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 245 1Iich. 65, 222 N.W. 325, 
67 A.L.R. 373, and in the annotation at 67 A.L.R. 385, 
which supplements a prior annotation in 17 A.L.R. 554. 
A still later annotation at 122 A.L.R. 1464 reviews these 
same cases and some later ones and comes to this con-
elusion: 
''But in determining whether the right thus 
created is one of property for which compensa-
tion must be made when land subject to such right 
is taken by eminent domain or is voluntarily 
deeded to be used for public purposes, the courts 
remain in irreconcilable conflict. '' 
In connection with this point, we feel compelled to 
cite three cases because the language used seems par-
ticularly applicable. In each case, the court held that 
building restrictions had no basis for value in condem-
nation proceedings. 
In Doan v. Cleveland Short LineR. Co., 92 Ohio St. 
4:61, 112 N .E. 505, the Court said: 
''If such restriction is not to be construed as 
preventing the use of the property for public 
purposes, then of course there is no violation on 
the part of the defendant, and it follows that no 
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recoverY can be had. If, on the other hand, it is 
to be co~1strued as prohihiting the use of the prop-
erty for any purpose other than that of residences, 
it would prevent a public use of the lots and 
thereby defeat the right of eminent domain. No 
covenant in a deed restricting the real estate con-
veyed to certain uses and preventing other uses 
can operate to prevent the state, or any body 
politic or corporate having the authority to exer-
cise the right of eminent domain, from devoting 
such property to a public use. The right of 
eminent domain rests p.pon public necessity, and 
a contract or covenant or plan of allotment which 
attempts to prevent the exercise of that right is 
clearly against public policy and is therefore 
illegal and void. Plaintiff's right to compensation, 
if it exists, must be based upon the restrictive 
covenant in the deeds and the general plan adopt-
ed. To give to plaintiff this right we would be 
compelled to recognize a right existing under 
"\¥hat we hold to be an invalid restriction." 
And in United States v. Certa.in Lands, 112 Fed. 622, 
the Court said: 
''While the owners may so contract as to con-
trol private business, and there by increase the 
values of their estates, they are not entitled so to 
contract as to control the action of the govern-
ment, or to increase the values of their lands by 
any expectation or belief that the government will 
not carry on public 'vorks in their vicinity, or that 
in case it does it 'viii compensate them for the loss 
due to the defeat of their expectation that it would 
not .... Each lando,vner holds his estate subject 
to the public necessity for the exercise of the right 
of eminent domain for public purposes. He can-
not evade this by any agreement with his neigh-
bor, nor can his neighbor acquire a right from a 
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private individual which imposes a new burden 
upon the public in the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain.'' 
And in Moses v. Hazen, 63 App. D.C. 104, 69 F. 2d 
842, 98 A.L.R. 386, the Court said : 
''As against the sovereign in discharge of a 
governmental function, rights such as are here 
claimed are not enforceable to restrict or burden 
the exercise of eminent domain; for the claims 
of these appellants are not for damage to what 
are sometimes called true easements, as right of 
passage or rights to light and air, which are land 
and subject to condemnation as other interests in 
land, but the restrictions on \Vhich appellants rely 
are not truly property rights, but contractual 
rights, which the government in the exercise of 
its sovereign power may take without payment of 
compensation.'' 
And the further statement was also made that 
''It is the rule in such cases that covenants 
limiting the use of property must be strictly con-
strued and not extended by implication.'' 
A holding to the same effect was reached in the cases 
of Anderson v. Lynch, (Ga.), 3 S.E. 2d 85, 122 A.L.R. 
1456, Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 
1080, and Sackett v. Los Angeles City School District, 
118 Cal. A pp. 254, 5 P. 2d 23. 
The statement of the Court in the case of Moses v. 
Hazen, supra, foreshadows and supplements the state-
ment of this Court in United States v. Fourth District 
Court, supra, where it was stated: 
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"We believe that the line of dem.arcation 
should be drfnvn at the point of "aetiona ble dam-
age.'' The Constitution elearly does not requirP 
compensation for damages not recognized as 
actionable at common la-\Y, but for a damaging of 
property ''to the actionable degree'' the Consti-
tution makers intended the landowner to have 
just compensation equally with the landowner 
'vhose property was physically taken.'' 
We have now discussed and, we believe, fairly ana-
lyzed those cases dealing with restrictive covenants 
applicable to real property subject to condemnation, and 
it should be noted that in each case the use to be made 
of the property by the condemnor is conceded to be a 
violation of the restrictive covenant. We again allude 
to the statement that we heretofore made to the effect 
that appell~nt has presented no evidence of any kind 
that would show that the proposed use by the State of 
Utah "\Vould in any manner effect a breach of those 
covenants. 
Ho"\\rever, 've believe that appellant is not relying 
upon . these restrictive covenants even though its state-
ment of points specifically refers to them, but rather 
that it basis its damage upon the alleged oral agreement 
with Wagener Improvement Company as to future de-
velopment. It is our contention that there was no material 
evidence of the existence of any agreement and that is 
the subject of our next point in this brief; and, at this 
point, we are assuming that the agreement was proved 
and we shall demonstrate that this fact does not entitle 
the app.ellant to any damage as against the condemnor, 
State of Utah. 
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It should be first noted that this alleged agreement 
is purely a personal contract between the appellant and 
Wagener Improvement Company and that by no stretch 
of the imagination could it be called a restrictive cove-
nant as to the land involved. On page 9 of its brief, ap-
pellant refers to it as "reciprocal agreements" and it 
could be nothing more as it has none of the required 
elements that go to make a negative easement or an 
equitable servitude, as these restrictive covenants are 
called. 
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Section 
5.76(2) at page 115, contains a statement that we con-
tend is controlling and we have found no cases contrary 
to the ones there cited. The section above mentioned 
reads as follows : 
''The mere fact that a business has assumed 
the form of existing profitable contracts with 
respect to the use of the land does not, under 
ordinary circumstances, warrant the award of 
damages in excess of the value of the land. The 
strongest examples of such contracts are leases 
of the premises or agreements to lease the same 
to solvent tenants at a greater rent than the 
present fair rental value of the premises, and 
contracts to sell the produce of the soil at a profit-
able price. The taking of the land terminates all 
contracts in respect to its use and the owner is 
under no liability for his failure to carry out such 
agreements, but it is well settled that he is not 
entitled to compensation for the loss of his con-
tracts. No distinction has been drawn between a 
damage to business caused by making impossible 
the performance of existing contracts and a dam-
age consisting of the loss of expected contracts. 
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If an o"\vner of land taken hy eminent domain is 
not entitled to compensation for the loss of profi1 s 
on his contracts, existing and expected, taken as 
a whole-that is, injury to his business-a fortiori 
he is not entitled to compensation for the loss of 
expected profits on a single contract. 
"It is true that the constitution of the United 
States prohibits a state from enacting any la\r 
impairing the obligation of contracts, but a sta-
tute authorizing the taking of land with respect 
to the use of which a valid contract is in existence 
is not obnoxious to this provision, even if no com-
pensation is awarded for the annulment of the 
contract, since all contracts for the use of land 
are entered into in view of the possible taking of 
the land for public use, and the sovereign power 
of eminent domain cannot be impaired by con-
tracts of private parties. It is only when "prop-
erty" is created by contract, as in the case of a 
franchise or a lease, that the protection of the 
constitution can be invoked.'' 
Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain, Section 
·75, contains a similar statement; and finally we desire to 
cite the case of Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 
42, 172 Pac. 689, and the statement by the Court on page 
694 of the Pacific Reporter as follows : 
''Indeed "\ve kno"\v of no case which holds that 
a parol agreement to maintain fences runs with 
the land. ' ' 
It is, therefore, respectfully contended by the re-
spondent that the authorities above cited show conclu-
sively that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict was properly granted by the trial court on all of 
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the following grounds and is sustainable on any one of 
them: 
1. That under the law and the decisions of the State 
of Utah, restrictive covenants do not constitute actionable 
damage in eminent domain proceedings and are not com-
pensable by the State of Utah. 
2. That there is a complete failure of proof as to 
any injury or damage to any land subject to those re-
strictive covenants and a complete lack of any evidence 
as to the effect of the condemnation proceeding in rela-
tion to those restrictive covenants. 
3. That it has been universally held that private 
contracts may not impair the sovereign right of eminent 
domain. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED OF IT AND THE 
EVIDENCE AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT ANY 
ALLEGED INJURY OR DAMAGE TO IT WAS CON-
TINGENT, RENIOTE AND SPECULATIVE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT 
AND WAGENER IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, AND 
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS 
PROPER AS THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND 
MATERIAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY 
AGREEMENT. 
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\\T e are combining for argument points three and 
four in order to avoid repetition and because the argu-
ment in favor of one point of necessity is applicable to 
the other; and, generally, we are here concerned with 
the failure of proof. And, at this point, may we state 
that 've are not taking issue with appellant's point three, 
not necessarily because we agree with its argument but 
because, as '"e have demonstrated, the statute of frauds 
is not applicable and is immaterial. We do, however, 
very strenuously take issue with appellant's first state-
ment under his point three and we do most emphatically 
deny the existence of any agreement between Bird & 
Evans, Inc., and Wagener Improvement Company and 
the creation of any interest in land by reason thereof. 
First, we desire to discuss the evidence presented 
and to compare it with the required elements of a con-
tract. A contract must have parties, a subject matter, 
an offer and acceptance, a consideration and a time of 
performance, among other things. In the present case 
the subject matter is at best an indefinite and tenuous 
thing; there is, as far as we can ascertain from the 
record, no consideration of any kind passing to the 
Wagener Improvement Company; and the time of per-
formance was absolutely missing. The only evidence 
offered with respect to this claimed agreement was 
through the witness, Dean Brayton, who in effect stated 
that he felt that he was an agent of both parties, but his 
statements as to an agreement fell far short of proving 
its existence. If this present action were one instituted 
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by Bird & Evans, Inc. against the Wagener Improvement 
Company for breach of this alleged agreement and to 
recover from them the cost of bringing the utilities to 
the very doorstep of appellant, Bird & Evans, Inc., we 
do not feel that anyone would seriously contend that an 
agreement had been proved upon which a recovery of 
that sort could be had. The State of Utah, by reason 
of this condemnation proceeding, should certainly be in 
no worse a position in this respect than would their 
condemnees. 
With respect to the restrictive covenants themselves 
that were actually filed with relation to one part of the 
property condemned, there is some evidence of an agree-
ment that they would be generally applicable to all of 
the property in the area, including that of appellant, 
although when they might have become applicable was 
most speculative. However, the existence of this agree-
ment need be of no concern inasmuch as there is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record to indicate, even by 
inference, that the exercise of the right of eminent do-
main by the respondent here violated or constituted a 
breach of those covenants. 
The proof offered as to the damage suffered by 
appellant based upon the cost of bringing utilities to his 
property and of building sidewalks and streets is so far 
removed from the injury and damage that might have 
resulted from a breach of the restrictive covenants that 
it appears ridiculous. 
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The rule applicable is well stated in Rose v. State, 
19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505, where the Court at page 520 
of the Pacific Reporter stated: 
"In states such as California, where the re-
covery of damages depends upon the infringement 
of some right which the owner of land possesses 
in connection with his property, decisions have 
clearly indicated that, although the measure of 
damages is generally the dimunition in market 
value, the evidence relied upon to establish such 
dimunition must be based upon the depreciation 
flowing from the actionable injury which is the 
basis for the right to recover damages. Thus, in 
People v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P. 2d 87, 
a small portion of land was taken for public high-
. "ray purposes. It was contended on behalf of the 
landowner that because a small portion of land 
had been taken and because he was entitled to 
recover for that injury, the damages to his re-
maining land should be based upon the total de-
preciation in the value of his remaining property 
even though that depreciation was caused pri-
marily by an admittedly noncompensable element 
of damage, that is, diversion of traffic. The court 
said, however, that while dimunition in market 
value was ordinarily the test of damage to real 
property, the damages must be limited to those 
which accrue by 'reason of the legal injury for 
which compensation was due.'' 
And in City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App. 
2d 180, 210 P. 2d 717, at page 723, the Court said: 
"The award of $40,000 for the alleged excess 
cost of an overpass is indefensible even if the 
evidence admitted with reference thereto was un-
objectionable. While the ·recovery of damages is 
not limited to instances of actual invasion of the 
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land itself, yet damages can be justified only by 
evidence of direct physical disturbance of an 
existing right, either public or private, which the 
owner possesses in connection with his property 
and which gives an additional value to it and by 
evidence that through such disturbance he has 
sustained a special damage with respect to his 
property or to a right appurtenant thereto dif-
ferent from or in excess of that suffered by the 
public in general.'' 
And, on page 724, the Court said : 
''There can be no detriment to a right which 
never existed and no compensation for a loss not 
sustained. . . . Manifestly plain tiff cannot be re-
quired to pay damages for injury to a non-existent 
right or for a mere hope, surmise, conjecture or 
expectancy that a right might possibly be obtained 
in the future, . . . or for remote, speculative, 
imaginary, uncertain or conjectural possibilities.'' 
We respectfully submit that the language above 
quoted is particularly applicable to the claims of the 
appellants here and that the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court granted the respondent's written 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which 
motion was based upon three specified grounds, namely, 
the sovereign immunity of the State of Utah, the non-
compensable nature of the alleged damage of the appel-
lant and the complete failure of the appellant to sustain 
the burden of proof. We submit that the foregoing 
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argument and authorities demonstrate conclusively that 
the trial court's granting of this motion is sustainable 
on all three of the grounds presented although it is only 
necessary that it be sustained on any one. We respect-
fully urge upon this Court that the ruling of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
.. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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